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Introduction 
Since the referendum on membership of the European Union (EU) in June 2016, research 
continues to emerge on the socio-economic and psychological factors affecting Britain’s 
decision. There is a growing social science literature investigating voting patterns in the 2016 
referendum. Although the vote to leave the EU appeared to mark a seismic shift in the British 
polity, in reality the forces that drove it were visible beforehand. The single most powerful 
predictor of the share of the Leave vote in an area is the support for UKIP in European 
Parliament elections 2 years previously (M. J. Goodwin & Heath, 2016). 
Nevertheless, whilst a number of socio-political hypotheses have been proposed to explain 
the result, they are typically not grounded in psychological theory.  This is curious, as our 
desire is surely to understand why the vote unfolded as it did. Many of these processes are 
fundamentally social, embedded within communities and collective decision making. 
Therefore, most of the theories we mention in this chapter are explicitly Social Psychological. 
For example, whilst identity is individual, we only understand ourselves by our interactions 
with others and hence identity is deeply social. This cross-disciplinary chapter aims to 
contribute to widening the academic debate around UK’s decision to leave the EU by 
providing a bridge between social science research and that on the psychological processes 
behind Brexit. We posit this as a first pass at the problem rather than delivering any final 
answers, considering a range of psychological factors, including theories related to social 
identity, integrated threat, aversion amplification, locus of control and personality, and how 
these might relate to economic and demographic variables. 
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A Simple Econometric Model of the Brexit Vote 
Individual-level polling data suggests several demographic factors have significant 
associations with the probability that a person voted for Brexit (Ashcroft, 2016). Education, 
social class, education and ethnicity all have predictive power (ibid.). All of these factors are 
highly correlated with one another and we want to disentangle the impact of each of them 
after controlling for the others. We therefore posit a simple statistical model of the Brexit 
vote at the LA level where we can run multivariate analysis of this nature. Like most other 
studies on the Brexit vote (e.g. Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, 2017; M. J. Goodwin & Heath, 2016) 
we make use of aggregate data regressing explanatory variables on the percentage of 
eligible votes cast that were in favour of leaving the EU using data from the Electoral 
Commission (2016). 
Aggregate data in this case replace polling data, which are expensive to collect and subject 
to non-response bias, recall error, sampling difficulties and a number of other issues. 
Ultimately, any analysis based on aggregate data cannot show the determinants of the vote 
at an individual level. Our results are thus suggestive rather than absolute and we cannot 
necessarily use them to infer causality1.In theory the fact that the dependent variable is a 
proportion poses a problem but in practice there are no predicted results outside the 
interval and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) provides a linear model that should be locally 
appropriate2. More problematic are issues of model selection and errors-in-variables. 
Although we have up-to-date information on many variables, these are statistical samples 
subject to measurement error. Future work will undoubtedly want to consider using 
instrumental variables estimation in order to avoid bias. 
Model selection is another key issue: there are a plethora of variables that might be 
included and an entirely atheoretical approach is unlikely to be justified. To be truly 
rigorous, inference (in the mould of classical statistics) should not be on data already seen, 
although in practice it is impossible to ignore the results of other researchers with the same 
data. Becker et al. (2017) use a best subset selection procedure to an OLS regression to 
                                                            
1 Those in professional occupations were on average less likely than machine operatives to 
vote for Brexit, but this does not imply that a solicitor who decides to retrain as a machine 
operative (or vice versa) will suddenly switch their vote. 
2 When we ran a beta regression the results were qualitatively similar in terms of statistically 
significant variables. 
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derive a statistically sound model, including a number of innovative variables not previously 
seen in the literature.  
Data 
Given the findings of Ashcroft (2016), we include demographic data on ethnicity, education, 
age and a proxy for social class. Competition for scarce resources, austerity, immigration 
and a lack of opportunities in declining regions and “places that don’t matter” (Rodríguez-
Pose, 2018, p. 189) may have had an impact on the Brexit vote so we included variables 
capturing these.  
Data on ethnicity was taken from the Annual Population Survey (ONS, 2017a)3. Whilst this 
contains data on several ethnic groups and the proportion born abroad, they have large 
coefficients of variation, which is likely to lead to inconsistent results (due to the errors-in-
variables problem). Worse, some LAs have no result at all. Therefore, we instead consider 
the change in the proportion of the population which is “white British” in each LA. These 
data are much more robust but do not allow us to consider European and non-European 
ethnic groups separately. 
We consider the proportion of residents in each LA who were white British and the change 
in this proportion over ten years. The former functions as our measure of ethnicity whilst 
the latter is a measure of immigration intensity. Data on education are available from the 
same data source. In order to ensure comparability across the UK we consider education by 
NVQ equivalent, including variables on the proportion of the population with NVQ4+ 
(broadly speaking equivalent to a degree) and those with an NVQ2 (equivalent to 5 A*-C 
GCSEs) or below. The APS contains data on the proportion of the population in Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC) categories 1-3, which includes managers, professionals, 
associates and technical staff4. 
Age data come from the ONS’s population estimates. We include the proportion of over 65s 
and the proportion of under 30s in each LA. Also included are two measures of austerity 
originally posited by Becker et al. (2017), specifically the proportion of NHS cancer patients 
                                                            
3 Henceforth APS 
4 Although there is no agreed measure of social class, this is widely seen as an acceptable proxy for those in so-
called “middle class” jobs. 
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treated within 62 days and the total reduction in benefit spending per working adult in each 
LA as reported by the Financial Times (2013). 
Median income for residents of each LA is taken from the Annual Survey on Hours and 
Earnings (ONS, 2017b). We take an average of median pay by LA over the past three years in 
order to minimise the errors-in-variables problem. Given the evidence on the “left-behind”, 
it seems possible that individuals living in areas that have experienced particular economic 
difficulties since European enlargement are more likely to have voted Leave if the “threat” 
posed by a weaker economy has led them to increased in-group identification. Although we 
have no direct evidence, we include a number of variables likely to be linked to economic 
strength and resilience. This includes the change in median pay over the past decade (we 
use a 3-year average and compare it to the same 3-year period a decade earlier) from ASHE 
and the unemployment rate by LA, which is sourced from the APS. 
The share of the economy made up by the manufacturing sector in 1998 (ONS, 2017c) is also 
included as a proxy for economic decay. Given the precipitous decline in manufacturing 
employment over the past 20 years it’s probable that areas with a larger manufacturing 
base have been hardest hit by deindustrialisation. Given some of the qualitative findings 
regarding “regret”, which we discuss later, we also included the Leave vote share in 1975 as 
a variable alongside regional dummies. 
Results 
Coefficient Estimate  
(Intercept) 54.71 ** 
 (11.75)  
% of Population who are white British 0.23 ** 
 (0.05)  
% growth in full-time salaries over the 
past decade -0.03  
 (0.04)  
Median full-time salaries (in £1000) 0.04  
 (0.13)  
% increase in the proportion of the 
population who are not white British 
over the past decade 0.58 ** 
 (0.09)  
% with NVQ4+ -0.47 ** 
 (0.09)  
% over 65 0.14  
 (0.10)  
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% under 30 -0.34 ** 
 (0.09)  
% who voted Leave in 1975 0.19 ** 
 (0.07)  
East Midlands dummy 1.28  
 (1.03)  
London dummy 1.76  
 (1.83)  
North East dummy 1.04  
 (1.89)  
North West dummy -1.15  
 (1.40)  
Scotland dummy -14.54 ** 
 (1.61)  
South East dummy 1.54  
 (0.99)  
South West dummy -1.53  
 (1.16)  
Wales dummy -3.68 * 
 (1.59)  
West Midlands dummy 2.55 * 
 (1.12)  
Yorkshire & Humberside dummy 1.61  
 (1.28)  
% in SOC groups 1-3 -0.15 * 
 (0.06)  
Proportion of cancer patients treated 
within 62 days -0.09 * 
 (0.04)  
Share of manufacturing in 1998 6.34  
 (3.99)  
Unemployment Rate 0.21  
 (0.18)  
% with NVQ2 or below 0.05  
 (0.09)  
Estimated per capita austerity by region 
(in £100) 0.06  
 0.41  
 
Residual standard error: 4.148 on 301 degrees of freedom (52 observations missing)  ** = significant at 1% * = significant at 5% 
R2 : 0.858, Adjusted R2 :  0.8467 
 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors were used. After controlling for the other factors, 
LAs with a higher proportion of people in the “white British” ethnic group tended to vote 
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Leave more heavily. Each additional percentage point was associated with a 0.23 percentage 
point increase in the Leave vote. 
In contrast, the change in the proportion of white Britons over the past decade in an area is 
negatively associated with the Leave vote. Whilst this might initially seem counterintuitive, 
the first variable is a measure of the ethnic composition of an area whereas the second is a 
measure of the change in ethnic composition and is strongly associated with migration. 
Ceteris paribus, exposure to immigration significantly increases the Leave vote of an area: 
each 1 percentage point rise is associated with a 0.58 percentage point increase in the Leave 
vote. 
The proportion of highly educated individuals (NVQ4+) is strongly negatively related to the 
Leave vote but lower education levels appear to have little effect. The difference between 
those with A-levels and those who left school at 16 is not significant. Although a high 
proportion of under-30s is associated with a stronger Remain vote, the proportion of over-
65s in an LA is not statistically significant after controlling for other factors (e.g. the lower 
education levels of this group). The latter chimes with the results of Liberini, Oswald, Proto, 
and Redoano (2017) who use a completely different dataset and methodology, giving 
confidence in the finding. More generally, these results fit nicely with the findings of Fielding 
(2018), who argues that find the inhabitants of areas with a high density of universities hold 
social views that are significantly more liberal than inhabitants of other areas. 
In contrast to our hypotheses on regret and roadshow findings (De Ruyter, Hearne, Guy, 
Semmens-Wheeler, & Goodwin, 2018, Forthcoming; Semmens-Wheeler & Hill, In prep.), a 
higher vote in favour of leaving in 1975 is associated with a higher vote in favour of leaving in 
2016, suggesting a degree of regional consistency over time. Nevertheless, this effect is quite 
weak and there is considerable heterogeneity. Given the large majority in favour of remaining 
in 1975, it is clear that many individuals must have changed their minds in order to deliver 
the Brexit result of today. 
Being in Scotland was associated with a near 15 percentage point drop in the Leave share. 
Intriguingly, after controlling for demographic factors regions in Wales also voted Leave less 
strongly than equivalent regions in England (by around 3.7 percentage points). The only 
English region that differed from the rest was the West Midlands (which voted Leave more 
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strongly than might be expected from its demographics). The proportion of an LA’s population 
in SOC groups 1-3 was associated with a lower Leave vote, suggesting that occupation was an 
important marker.  Finally, the proportion of cancer patients treated within 62 days was 
significant at the 5% level, although the effect was quantitatively small. This is indicative that 
there could have been an austerity effect on the vote, although more evidence will be needed 
before more concrete judgements can be made. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients on the remainder of the variables are zero (either individually or jointly), 
although they mostly have the expected signs. Inability to reject the null does not necessarily 
mean that these effects do not exist. If we use a best subset selection procedure minimising 
the Schwartz-Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) then we arrive at the following model:  
Coefficient Estimate  
(Intercept) 79.38 ** 
 (5.25)  
% of Population who are white British 0.18 ** 
 (0.03)  
% increase in the proportion of the 
population who are not white British 
over the past decade 0.53 ** 
 (0.07)  
% with NVQ4+ -0.52 ** 
 (0.05)  
% under 30 -0.43 ** 
 (0.06)  
Scotland dummy -12.8 ** 
 (0.91)  
West Midlands dummy 2.61 ** 
 (0.70)  
% in SOC groups 1-3 -0.18 ** 
 (0.05)  
Proportion of cancer patients treated 
within 62 days -0.11 * 
 (0.04)  
Residual standard error: 4.353 on 366 degrees of freedom (3 observations missing)  ** = significant at 1% * = significant at 5% 
R2 : 0.827, Adjusted R2 :  0.823 
Again, errors are robust and coefficient interpretation is as above. Parsimony is a clear 
strength and the results of a RESET test give no reason to believe that higher-order terms 
would be useful predictors. This is reassuring given the inherent non-linearity of many of our 
variables. Also reassuring is the fact that coefficients have the same sign and similar 
magnitude to those in the larger model. 
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There remain a number of troubling econometric issues that future work will undoubtedly 
want to concentrate on in order to refine our understanding further. Future work will 
undoubtedly want to make heavier use of ward-level data and although all efforts have been 
made to minimise errors-in-variables, researchers may wish to consider using instruments to 
avoid this problem entirely. Similarly, given the non-linearity of the dependent variable 
researchers are likely to wish to experiment with non-linear regression, although this is 
unlikely to overturn any of the results found by ourselves and other researchers. Future work 
will also want to try and ascertain the individual level coefficients associated with several of 
these variables (e.g. how much does being a graduate reduce the probability that one voted 
for Brexit). Finally, further attention needs to be paid to how to measure labour market 
insecurity and precariousness, as well as perhaps using additional datasets to enhance our 
understanding. 
Factors underlying our results 
We now employ a social psychological approach to understand the quantitative results above. 
Having identified several variables that help to predict how likely an area was to vote Leave, 
what we really seek to understand is why groups with these particular demographic 
characteristics may have felt particularly compelled to vote Leave. Our approach is partly 
informed by our ongoing qualitative research into the Brexit result. We now begin to interpret 
the results by turning to the key role that social identity appears to have played in the result. 
Social Identity and Group Polarisation 
It is widely believed that immigration was a key factor driving the decision to leave the EU (M. 
Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017). Research suggests that a perceived threat from immigrant “out-
groups” was a predictive factor in voting to Leave (Van de Vyver, Leite, Abrams, & Palmer, 
2018). This perceived threat from immigration could have been accentuated by increases in 
immigration levels in areas with strong Leave votes (M. Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017; M. J. 
Goodwin & Heath, 2016).  
Most evidence suggests that immigration has only modest (usually positive) effects on the 
wages of natives (Dustmann, Frattini, & Preston, 2013; Ottaviano & Peri, 2012) and European 
migration in particular has had a positive impact on the UK’s fiscal position (Dustmann & 
Frattini, 2014). As a result, concern over migration is difficult to explain from the perspective 
De Ruyter, A. & Nielsen, B. (2018). Brexit: one year on from Article 50 - Reflections from Academia, 
Business and Politics 
9 
 
of pure economic self-interest5, so contemporary research has tended to focus on other 
factors (McLaren & Johnson, 2007), implying that broader issues such as identity are likely to 
be at play here. 
Social identity theory (SIT) was developed to account for how and why individuals from 
disadvantaged minority groups often do not directly confront dominant societal majority 
groups, even if their group is disadvantaged (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1978). The theory 
may help explain why those who were less likely to identify as European are more likely to 
vote Leave (Van de Vyver et al., 2018). SIT, suggests that a portion of an individual’s self-
concept is derived from their perceived or actual membership of certain social groups, as well 
as their non-membership to other groups. An influx of incomers can threaten self-identity, 
causing anxiety and negative contact encounters. 
Class is a further marker of identity. Those who self-identify as working-class tend to have 
more authoritarian and less pro-immigrant opinions (NatCen Social Research, 2016).  These 
are also views that are typically associated with pro-Brexit voting patterns. Class is a 
fascinating avenue to explore, because Brexit has ignited passions that are difficult to 
reconcile with an issue that is primarily technical in nature (those whose eyes glaze over at a 
discussion of models of trade have suddenly found that membership of a customs union is an 
issue of profound and totemic importance to them). 
A person’s social identity and perceived threat from out-groups can influence voting 
intentions and behaviours (Van de Vyver et al., 2018). Research suggests that identity (and 
particularly English identity) is a crucial motivating factor for voting Leave (Henderson et al., 
2016). One’s social identity is important to health and wellbeing (Jetten, Haslam, & Haslam, 
2012), but the perceived threat from those who do not share our social identity, or out-group 
members, can lead to some strong views. For example, one participant in our qualitative work 
on attitudes towards Brexit said, “The Islamic group is a clear and present danger to western 
civilization and it needs to be banned. It will never be assimilated or integrated and its stated 
aim is to overwhelm and out breed the indigenous peoples of Europe”.  
                                                            
5 Although there is something of a consensus in the literature, this view is by no means universally held ((e.g. 
Borjas, 2003). There is some evidence that immigration may have had a modestly deleterious effect on 
incomes in the bottom two deciles (Dustmann et al., 2013) but this struggles to explain why immigration was 
such a salient issue for a majority of voters – particularly those above retirement age. 
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There certainly seems to be a sense of threat, “I am happy for immigrants to come to Britain. 
However, they should come with respect for the people who live here and respect our culture. 
They should not come and expect the country to become more like their native country, 
because we're our own country with our own culture and our own principles. Britain should 
stay British, but welcome immigrants to share our cultural values, otherwise what makes 
Britain a separate country from other places in the world?” (Semmens-Wheeler & Hill, In 
prep.) 
Fear about sharing economic and social resources has the potential to create group 
polarisation. Some evidence finds that unfavourable economic conditions are typically linked 
to stronger anti-immigrant sentiment (Meuleman, 2011;).  The deep recession of 2008 and 
tepid recovery appears to have seen a hardening in attitudes towards immigration, 
particularly because threat leads to increased in-group identification at the cost of the 
outgroup (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002).  Another psychological theory that 
could explain this phenomenon is Intergroup Threat Theory (ITT) (Stephan, Ybarra, & 
Morrison, 2009). 
ITT suggests that prejudice and negative attitudes towards out-groups (e.g. immigrants) can 
be explained by both realistic threats and symbolic threats. The former influence physical 
wellbeing and the economic and political power of the in-group. The latter come from cultural 
differences in values, morals,  worldviews and negative stereotypes from the in-group about 
the out-group (Stephan et al., 2009). Additionally, intergroup anxiety is experienced by the 
in-group when interacting with out-group members. This theory could be used to explain how 
EU immigrants are seen as a potentially harmful out-group by non-EU-migrant in-groups, 
through the perceived competition for limited resources (i.e. realistic threat). 
This, in turn, could lead to hostility towards the out-group, which may have been expressed 
in a vote to leave the EU. It is also possible that people voted for the EU against their own 
interests because of a perceived symbolic threat that the values of their in-group could be at 
risk. Other factors, such as socioeconomic status (SES) can be linked to threat perceptions. 
For example, those with lower SES are more reactive to threat (Kraus, Horberg, Goetz, & 
Keltner, 2011).  It is likely this was a contributory factor to the high proportion of Leave voters 
among lower SES groups (Skinner & Gottfried, 2016), particularly given that research has 
alluded to a ‘geography of discontent’ (Los, McCann, Springford, & Thissen, 2017). If certain 
De Ruyter, A. & Nielsen, B. (2018). Brexit: one year on from Article 50 - Reflections from Academia, 
Business and Politics 
11 
 
areas are experiencing discontent due to perceived deprivation, slowing productivity and 
limited investment then this could be combined with fears related to immigration leading 
some to hypothesise that these left-behind areas drove the vote (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). 
Given the strong incentives to relocate that a lack of local opportunity creates, it is 
unsurprising that individuals who remain in such areas feel that EU membership has not 
benefitted them.Low political trust amplifies existing anti-immigration sentiments (Abrams & 
Travaglino, 2018). In this context, it is significant that trust in politicians in the UK is near all-
time lows & has fallen since the financial crisis & recession (Freeguard, 2015). This is 
particularly true of trust in Brussels as the Brexit vote has demonstrated. 
 
Terror Management Theory 
For some, voting to leave the EU could have been an expression of fear and hostility. This is 
further explained by TMT. Terror Management Theory (TMT) (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & 
Solomon, 1986) highlights the motivational significance of our uniquely human awareness of 
mortality. According to Becker, in the absence of certain compelling psychological protective 
mechanisms, the knowledge that we are one day going to die creates the potential for severe 
dread. Greenberg et al. (1986) posit that when threat is activated, one's own cultural 
worldviews are even more strongly adhered to. For example, when people are afraid, people 
tend to cling even more strongly to their own cultural worldviews and are likely to stand by 
their values more. This, in turn, may strengthen in-group and out-group polarisation (Van de 
Vyver et al., 2018). Areas with high immigration benefitted from trade with the EU through 
industry, yet still voted Leave. This could involve Leave voters seeing the EU as an out-group, 
or anyone who does not appear to share their worldview, such as politicians, or immigrants. 
It is important to note that the UK’s low SES ‘left-behind’ are not the only socially distinct 
group to show a trend for voting in favour of Brexit. Declining economic conditions have led 
to the emergence of what has been referred to as “the squeezed middle”, self-identified 
middle class individuals who perceive a decline in their socioeconomic circumstances and 
whose incomes have reduced, in real terms, by 8.7 percent (Milliard, 2014; Strauss, 2018). 
This group also contributed strongly to the Leave vote (Antonucci, Horvath, Kutiyski, & 
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Krouwel, 2017).  Clearly, then, working classes are not the only social groups to feel left behind 
by globalisation and the widening economic gap. 
 
Locus of Control 
   
Research has shown that individuals with lower Socioeconomic status (SES) tend to have 
lower sense of control (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009), feel politically excluded and experience 
having less control over socio-political issues. They also tend to focus on external 
uncontrollable forces that influence their lives. Those with an external locus of control tend 
to have more anti-immigrant attitudes, which are related to (but distinct from) racial 
prejudice (Harell, Srokora, & Iyengar, 2017). This could, therefore contribute to blaming the 
EU, politicians, immigration, et cetera, for their life circumstances, and a chance to change 
the status quo by voting to leave the EU.  
Populist movements have capitalised on the predicament of the left behind, arguing that the 
cosmopolitan elite disregard the lower, ‘left-behind’ classes, allowing low-skilled immigration 
to increase competition for jobs and failing to help communities to recover from the effects 
of recession (Lee et al., 2018). Understandably, then, the “left-behind” in Britain tend to feel 
that they have little power over events in their lives. Indeed, participants in our own research 
described feeling that the areas in which they lived received little to no investment from the 
government. One man in a small town in Lincolnshire said “All the money goes to London… 
all their transport links. We don’t see any of the money.” (De Ruyter et al., 2018, Forthcoming; 
Semmens-Wheeler & Hill, In prep.) 
External locus of control in low SES areas may combine with lack of ‘openness’, a psychological 
trait that encompasses curiosity and an openness to new and unconventional ideas (McCrae 
& Costa, 2004).  This trait is regionally clustered (Garretsen, Stoker, Soudis, Martin, & 
Rentfrow, 2018) and, again, low levels of openness (characterised by preference for 
familiarity, routine and being relatively closed to new experiences) are seen in low SES area.. 
For example, higher areas of agreeableness and openness have been found to predict a 
Remain vote, whereas other traits, such as neuroticism and extraversion have been found to 
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promote Leave votes. Particular regions also appear to have a higher anti-immigrant 
sentiment (Czaika & Di Lillo, 2018). There appears to be significant spatial dependence – 
proximate regions exhibit similar attitudes towards immigrants.  Within the UK, London, the 
South East, Scotland and Northern Ireland all exhibit slightly lower anti-immigrant attitudes 
towards those of different ethnicity. 
This does appear to coincide with regions where the vote in favour of Brexit was the least 
strong, raising the possibility of common factors. Certainly, London, the South East and 
Scotland all have educational attainment levels higher than other regions in Great Britain. 
Research suggests that graduates tend to have increased agreeableness, particularly if they 
are from disadvantaged backgrounds (Kassenboehmer, Leung, & Schurer, 2018) and a higher 
level of education has been linked to a higher locus of control than in lower education (e.g. 
high school or less) (Smith, 2003). This is interesting given the links between Higher Education 
and voting preferences.  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
A number of factors appear to have had an impact on the Brexit vote.  To a large extent our 
findings mirror earlier research, although there are nuances. Education appears to be a crucial 
factor, as does exposure to immigration. Even after controlling for other variables, areas with 
a large young population tended to have a higher “remain” vote, although the same does not 
appear to be true amongst the very old, reinforcing the findings of Liberini et al. (2017).  LAs 
in Scotland had a much lower propensity to vote Leave than other areas. The West Midlands, 
on the other hand, voted Leave particularly strongly, even after accounting for demographic 
factors. Social class also appears to have played a strong role and, of course, migration proved 
to be every bit as critical as anecdotal evidence suggested. 
 
A variety of social-psychological factors appear to have played a significant role in driving this, 
with social identity, group polarisation and intergroup threat theory all apparently driving 
some of the antipathy towards high levels of immigration.  Similarly, groups experiencing a 
low locus of control appear to have voted Leave more strongly with low political trust 
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amplifying these trends. The upshot is that work on understanding both the socio-economic 
environment and psychological processes underlying the populist votes of the early 21st 
century, of which Brexit is just one, is still in its infancy and future cross-disciplinary 
collaboration is essential if we are to develop a holistic understanding of them. 
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